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Abstract. We introduce the first deniable attribute-based key exchange (DABKE) framework that is resilient to imperson-
ation attacks. We define the formal security models for DABKE framework, and propose a generic compiler that converts any
attribute-based key exchanges into deniable ones. We prove that it can achieve session key security and user privacy in the
standard model, and strong deniability in the simulation-based paradigm. In particular, the proposed generic compiler ensures:
1) a dishonest user cannot impersonate other user’s session participation in conversations since implicit authentication is used
among authorized users; 2) an authorized user can plausibly deny his/her participation after secure conversations with others;
3) the strongest form of deniability is achieved using one-round communication between two authorized users.
Keywords: Attribute-based Key Exchange, Impersonation Attacks, Strong Deniability, Generic Compiler
1. Introduction
Authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols are the core cryptographic primitives for many network
security standards such as IPSec/IKE, TLS and SSH. AKE aims to share a secret key among multiple
users over an insecure communication channel, where users authenticate each other using their identities
or public keys. AKE can further be explored in the attribute-based context [1–3]: attribute-based AKE
(AB-AKE), which enables fine-grained access control among authorized users. Specifically, AB-AKE
provides authentication to authorized users based on whether their attributes satisfy a policy. The AB-
AKE mechanism is significantly useful in many real-world applications, such as distributed collaborative
systems [1, 3]. In practice, it is desirable for users to communicate with each other based on their roles
or responsibilities instead of identities or public keys.
*Corresponding author. E-mail: ymu.ieee@gmail.com.
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AB-AKE has some inherent properties such as anonymity [4] and deniability [5], because different
authorized users may satisfy the same policy. The anonymity means that authorized users are anony-
mous from the viewpoint of communication counterparts. Such property is implicitly held in AB-AKE
due to the feature of fine-grained authentication. As for deniability, it allows authorized users to deny
their participating in conversations if the security of communications is later compromised. In particular,
deniability is the most important property in secure messaging protocols [6, 7] such as Off-the-Record
(OTR) Messaging protocol [8] and Signal [9]. Since personal or business communications may be re-
vealed or leaked in practice, deniable secure messaging protocols are becoming more important to these
private communications.
The inherent anonymity may bring a security risk to AB-AKE. For example, we consider an ad hoc
group of users with their associated attributes are participating in a text messaging. The secure key
establishment, as a central building block of most text messaging constructions, is vulnerable to imper-
sonation attacks. Roughly speaking, a dishonest receiver can successfully impersonate another receiver
to establish a shared secret key with a text sender for subsequent conversations, if receivers with different
attributes satisfy the same policy. As a result, the text sender and the impersonator (dishonest receiver)
perform the delivery of messages using the established shared secret key.
One may question the importance of preventing AB-AKE from impersonation attacks. To see why it is
essential, consider AB-AKE in a multi-party setting where it is possible that a malicious authorized user
can successfully impersonate other authorized users. For example, a malicious user Alice attempts to
impersonate an honest user Bob to establish a conversion with another user Charlie, but the impersonated
user Bob was not actually involved in the conversation with Charlie. Such an attack is possible in a multi-
party setting due to the inherent anonymous property of attribute-based systems. Although there are
some existing works on AB-AKE [1, 2], they have not addressed the issue of impersonation attacks. We
stress that in the “design" of AB-AKE, such impersonation attacks naturally exist because authorized
users authenticate each other based on their access policies or attributes sets. On the other hand, the
impersonation attacks are indeed not desirable when using AB-AKE protocols in real-world applications
such as text messaging.
The impersonation attacks are easy to prevent if non-repudiable digital signature schemes are applied
to protocol transcripts. However, this contradicts to inherent deniability of AB-AKE. The main goal
of this work is to design deniable key exchanges in attribute-based setting while the impersonation-
resistance is held. Furthermore, it is also desirable to establish a shared secret key using minimal com-
munication rounds. In this work, we construct a deniable attribute-based key exchange (DABKE) frame-
work with one-round communication in a two-party setting.
We stress that designing “impersonation resistant", “strongly deniable" and “non interactive" DABKE
framework is a non-trivial task. Recall that the naive way to prevent impersonation attacks is to use non-
repudiable digital signature schemes on protocol transcripts. For example, the digital signature based
SIGMA protocol [5] can achieve a weak form of deniability, but not the strong deniability we desired.
Such weak form of deniability merely allows an accused sender to deny his/her communication with a
specific receiver in conversations, but the accused sender cannot deny his/her signed protocol transcripts.
While strong deniability allows the accused sender to later plausibly deny sending messages and par-
ticipating in a conversation. Another possible way is to use non-malleable zero-knowledge (ZK) proof
on protocol transcripts, such as deniable AKE protocol in [10]. Its strong deniability is achieved via a
challenge-response mechanism for proving the knowledge (e.g., user’s secret key) to its peer in a ZK
manner. However, its construction is not one-round.
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To achieve our design goal, we rely on the implicit authentication (which is used in classic HMQV
protocol [11]). It means that Alice knows that the only other party who could compute the shared secret
key as her is Bob (and vice versa). More precisely, if Alice later receives a message together with a MAC
tag that verifies with respect to the key generated from the session, then Alice is assured that the MAC
tag must have been generated by Bob [12]. The implicit authentication is naturally suitable to achieve
our design goal, in the sense that it enables the impersonation-resistance while the desired one-round
communication is held in a two-party setting.
In summary, deniable attribute-based key exchange DABKE framework has the following unique
features.
• Generic Construction. We provide a generic framework that is built on top of any implicitly au-
thenticated key exchanges and (ciphertext-policy based) attribute-based encryption schemes. In ad-
dition, the generic framework relies on standard model assumptions;
• Impersonation Resistance. Authorized users can securely authenticate each other for private con-
versations, and prevent impersonation attacks by exploiting implicit authentication;
• Strong Deniability. Authorized users can plausibly deny their participations after secure and private
conversations, even if the security of conversations is completely compromised later;
• Round Efficiency. We achieve the strongest form of deniability with one-round communication be-
tween two authorized users.
1.1. Related work
Attribute-based Encryption. Sahai and Waters [13] first proposed the fuzzy identity-based encryption,
in which users must match at least a certain threshold of attributes. Later, Goyal et al. [14] proposed two
types of attribute-based encryption (ABE): Key-policy ABE and Ciphertext-policy ABE. In particular,
Bethencourt et al. [15] proposed the first CP-ABE scheme that allowing the ciphertext policies to be very
expressive, but the scheme is secure in the generic group model. Large amount of works were followed
this trend, some of them [14, 16] are selectively secure under CPA (chosen plaintext attack), and some
of them [17, 18] are adaptively secure under CPA/CCA (chosen ciphertext attack) for general policies.
Key Exchange. Burmester and Desmedt [19] introduced several key exchange protocols in the multi-
party setting, including star-based, tree-based, broadcast-based and cyclic-based protocols. Later, a few
generic transformations [20, 21] were proposed to convert passive-secure group key exchange proto-
cols into active-secure ones. On the security models for key exchange protocols, Bellare and Rogaway
[22] introduced the first complexity-theoretic security model for key exchange under the symmetric-
key setting. The model was later extended and enhanced under different settings [23–25]. Canetti and
Krawczyk [26] later refined the previous models and proposed a new model, known as the CK model,
which is widely used in the analysis of many well-known key exchange protocols. Some variants [11, 27]
of CK model have also been proposed to allow the adversary to obtain either long-term secret key or
ephemeral secret key of the challenge session. The models in [2, 3] were naturally extended from ex-
tended CK (eCK) model [27] in the attribute-based setting, which allow adversary to access the master
secret key.
Deniable Key Exchange. Deniable authentication was formally introduced by Dwork et al. [28] us-
ing the simulation-based paradigm. It requires that the transmitted messages are authenticated, and the
simulator’s view can be simulated using adversary’s knowledge only. Later, Di Raimondo et al. [5] con-
sidered deniability of key exchange protocols, and formally presented two definitions: strong deniability
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and partial deniability. In particular, they used novel techniques to analyze strong deniability of SKEME
and partial deniability of SIGMA respectively. More precisely, they prove strong deniability of SKEME
based on the plaintext awareness of the underlying encryption scheme (in the standard model), and prove
partial deniability of SIGMA based on a special “oracle" since non-repudiable digital signature schemes
are used for authentication.
Jiang and Safavi-Naini [29] proposed an efficient key exchange protocol with full deniability, which
allows anyone to prove to a distinguisher (i.e., judge) that the communication between two participants
happened. Their deniable key exchange protocol is proven secure under the Bellare-Rogaway model
[22] in the public random oracle (pRO) (pRO is introduced by Pass [30], which is a weaker assump-
tion compared to random oracle model). A similar deniable work was proposed by Yao and Zhao [10].
They introduced the first provably secure internet key exchange protocol that provides strong deniability
for protocol participants simultaneously. In particular, their strong deniability analysis relies on the re-
stricted random oracle model (it is analogous to Pass’s non-programmable random oracle pRO[31]) and
(concurrent) knowledge of exponent assumption (KEA). Note that these solutions [10, 29, 32, 33] are
interactive deniable key exchanges.
The implicitly AKE protocols [11, 34, 35] formed another important research line in the literature.
They are not only enjoy high performance, but also ensure strong deniability. Based on the well-known
HMQV protocol, Yao and Zhao [34] proposed a family of implicitly AKE protocols. In addition, they
introduced a new notion: “honest player deniability" (HP-deniability). This assumption is the strongest
form of deniability for implicitly AKE protocols. Because anyone (including judge) can produce tran-
scripts and session keys that look valid to a judge. The relationship between HP-deniability and strong
deniability [5] is analogues to that between honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK) and standard ZK.
Recently, Schage [35] proposed a novel implicitly AKE protocol (TOPAS in short) with full perfect
forward secrecy. Interestingly, TOPAS also enjoys strong deniability defined in [5], such that adversary
is actually one of session participants. In addition, Unger and Goldberg [6] proposed a newly deniable
authenticated key exchange for secure messaging applications. In particular, they introduced the first
non-interactive Spawn∗ that offers forward secrecy and strong deniability against both (partical) on-line
and off-line distinguishers. The security of Spawn∗ relies on the Generalized Universal Composability
(GUC) framework [32] in the standard model. We compare our proposed framework with some typical
works in Table 1 to highlight our distinction: it shows that our proposed generic framework has user
privacy and strong deniability with one-round communication; the generic framework is proven secure
in the standard model.
1.2. Paper Organization
In the next section, we present the formal security models to capture the security requirements
(namely, session key security, user privacy and strong deniability) of a secure attribute-based key ex-
change protocol. We present our generic attribute-based secure key exchange compiler and formally
prove its security in section 3. The paper is concluded in section 4.
2. Security Model
In this section, we present the security models for our proposed generic deniable attribute-based se-
cure key exchanges. As mentioned in the introduction, a secure and deniable generic framework should
Tian et al. / DABKE: Secure Deniable Attribute-Based Key Exchange Framework 5
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44
45 45
46 46
Table 1
A comparative summary for deniable AKE protocols.
Function/Algorithm [5]a [29] [36] [34] [10] [35] [6]b Ours
User Privacyc X × × × × × X X
Standard Model X × × × × × X X
Non-interactived × × X X × X X X
KEA-relatede X × × × X × × ×
Implicit Auth N/Af N/A × X × X N/A X
†-Deniabilityg Strong Full Partialh Strongi Strong Strong Strong Strong
aThe SKEME protocol in [5].
bThe Spawn∗ protocol in [6].
cWe consider the user privacy with respect to non protocol participants in this work.
dWe denote one-round communication as non-interactive, and multi-round communications as interactive in this work.
eKEA-related assumptions are used for the proof of strong deniability.
fN/A denotes (e.g., plaintext awareness) public key cryptosystem is used to construct deniable AKE.
g† denotes the level/range of deniability, and a detailed comparison between various deniability models (including full, strong
and partial deniability) can be found in Section 2.5.
hIt denotes the peer-and-time deniability, which is a stronger assumption than the partial deniability offered by SIGMA [5].
iIt denotes the HP-deniability, which is a stronger assumption than the strong deniability offered by SKEME [5].
achieve several security goals: session key security, user privacy and strong deniability. Note that we for-
malize user privacy and strong deniability separately because deniability and privacy are two different
notions. Below we present corresponding security models to capture these requirements.
States. We define a system user set U with n users, i.e. |U| = n. We say an instance oracle ΠiU (e.g.,
session i of user U) may be used or unused, and a user U has unlimited number of instances called
oracles. The oracle is considered as unused if it has never been initialized. Each unused oracle ΠiU can
be initialized with a secret key sk. The oracle is initialized as soon as it becomes part of a group. After the
initialization the oracle is marked as used and turns into the stand-by state where it waits for an invocation
to execute a protocol operation. Upon receiving such invocation the oracle ΠiU learns its partner id
pidiU and turns into a processing state where it sends, receives and processes messages according to the
description of the protocol. During that stage, the internal state information stateiU is maintained by the
oracle. The oracle ΠiU remains in the processing state until it collects enough information to compute
the session key S KiU . As soon as S K
i
U is computed Π
i
U accepts and terminates the protocol execution
meaning that it would not send or receive further messages. If the protocol execution fails then ΠiU
terminates without having accepted.
Partnering. We denote the i-th session of a user U by ΠiU , the set of attribute by δU , and the access
structure by ΛU . We provide the definition of access structure in Section 3.1. Let the partner identifier
pidiU include the identities of participating users (including U) in the i-th session of user U with the
condition that ∀U j ∈ pidiU ,ΛU j(δU) = 1. Note that ΛU j denotes the access structure specified by one of
n − 1 users (e.g., U j), and ΛU j(δU) = 1 means the attributes set δU satisfies the access structure ΛU j .
In other words, pidiU is a collection of recognized participants by the instance oracle Π
i
U . Note that the
recognized participants mean that authorized users are communicating with user U at some sessions. We
also define sidiU as the unique session identifier belonging to user U of session i. Specifically, sid
i
U =
{m j}nj=1, where m j ∈ {0, 1}∗ is the message transcript (e.g., nonces) among users in pidiU . We say two
instance oracles ΠiU and Π
j
U′ are partners if and only if pid
i
U = pid
j
U′ and sid
i
U = sid
j
U′ .
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2.1. Definitions
A deniable attribute-based key exchange DABKE framework consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: This algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, outputs master public/secret key pair
(mpk,msk).
• KeyGen: This is an interactive algorithm between a user and central authority (CA). User takes
master public key mpk as input, outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). While CA takes the master
secret key msk, an attributes set δ and public key pk as input, outputs a decryption key dk. Note that
we focus on ciphertext-policy setting of attribute-based encryption in this work.
• KeyExchange: This is an interactive algorithm among authorized users. Each authorized user takes
his/her secret keys (sk, dk) and his/her counterpart’s public keys pk as input, outputs a shared secret
key S K.
2.2. Session Key Security
The security model for session key security is defined via a game between an adversary A and a
simulator (i.e., challenger) S. A is an active adversary with full control of communication channels
among all authorized users.
• Setup: S first generates master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk) for CA and public/secret key pair
{pki, ski} for n users by running the corresponding key generation algorithms, where ski denote the
secret key of user i. In addition, S honestly generates user’s attributes set {δi} and corresponding
decryption keys {dki}. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in the game.
• Training: A can make the following queries in arbitrary sequence to S.
∗ send: If A issues send query in the form of (U, i,m) to simulate a network message for the i-
th session of user U, then S would simulate the reaction of instance oracle ΠiU upon receiving
message m, and returns to A the response that ΠiU would generate; If A issues send query in the
form of (U ′, ‘start’, ΛU), then S creates a new instance oracle ΠiU′ and returns A with the first
protocol message under the access structure ΛU .
∗ long-term secret key reveal: If A issues a long-term key reveal (or corrupt, for short) query to
user i, then S will return the long-term secret keys (ski, dki) to A.
∗ ephemeral secret key reveal: If A issues an ephemeral secret key reveal query to (possibly unac-
cepted) instance oracle ΠiU , then S will return the ephemeral secret key contained in ΠiU at the
moment when the query is asked.
∗ master secret key reveal: If A issues a master secret key reveal query to CA, then S will return
the master secret key msk to A.
∗ session key reveal: A can issue session key reveal query to an accepted instance oracle ΠiU . If
the session is accepted (maybe terminated afterwards) successfully, then S will return the session
key to A; Otherwise, a special symbol ‘⊥’ is returned to A.
∗ test: This query can only be made to an successfully accepted fresh (as defined below) session i
of an user U. If the instance oracle ΠiU has generated a session key, then S does the following:
∗ If the coin b = 1, S returns the real session key to A;
∗ Otherwise, a random session key is drawn from the session key space and returns to A.
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It is also worth noting that A can continue to issue other queries after the test query. However,
the test session must maintain fresh throughout the entire game. Finally,A outputs b′ as its guess
for b. If b′ = b, then S outputs 1; Otherwise, S outputs 0.
Freshness. We say an accepted instance oracle ΠiU with attributes set δU and access structure ΛU is fresh
if A does not perform any of the following actions during the game:
• A issues session key reveal query to ΠiU or its accepted partnered instance oracles Π jU′ (if the latter
exists);
• A issues both long-term secret key reveal query to user U ′ s.t. U ′ ∈ pidiU and ephemeral secret key
reveal query for some instances Π jU′ partnered with Π
i
U .
• A issues long-term secret key reveal query to user U ′ s.t. U ′ ∈ pidiU prior to the acceptance of
instance ΠiU and there exist no instance oracles Π
j
U′ partnered with Π
i
U .
Note that master secret key reveal query to CA is equivalent to the long-term secret key reveal to
all users.
We define the advantage of an adversary A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = |Pr[S → 1]− 1/2|. (1)
Definition 2.1. We say a DABKE protocol has session key security if for any probabilistic polynomial-
time (PPT) A, AdvA(λ) is a negligible function of the security parameter λ.
2.3. User Privacy
Informally, an adversary (not authorized users) attempts to identify the authorized users involved in a
DABKE protocol. We then define the formal user privacy game between an adversaryA and a simulator
S as follows. Let A chooses a challenge access structure Λ∗ before the game.
• Setup: S first generates master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk) for the CA and public/secret key
pair {pki, ski} for n users by running the corresponding key generation algorithms, where ski denote
the long-term secret key of user i. In addition, S honestly generates user’s attribute sets {δi} and
corresponding decryption keys {dki}. S also tosses a random coin b which will be used later in the
game.
• Training:A is allowed to issue execute, ephemeral secret key reveal, long-term secret key reveal and
and session key reveal queries to S. Let U ′ denote the users whose attributes set satisfies Λ∗(δ) = 1,
and A is not allowed to issue long-term secret key reveal query to users in U ′.
Note that the execute query [25] can be used by (passive) A to invoke an honest execution of the
protocol and obtain a transcript of exchanged messages.
• Challenge: A randomly selects two users Ui,U j ∈ U ′ as the challenge candidates. A then sends the
challenge candidates to S. S simulates U∗b by either U∗b = Ui if b = 1 or U∗b = U j if b = 0, and
generates the protocol transcript using the access structure Λ∗.
Let the rest users {Ur} in U ′ interact with the challenge user U∗b , and A can access all the commu-
nication transcripts among them.
{Ur}r 6=i, j ↔ U∗b =
{
Ui b = 1
U j b = 0
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• Guess: A outputs b′ as its guess for b. If b′ = b, then S outputs 1; Otherwise, S outputs 0.
We define the advantage of A in the above game as
AdvA(λ) = |Pr[S → 1]− 1/2|.
Definition 2.2. We say a DABKE protocol has user privacy if for any PPT A, AdvA(λ) is a negligible
function of the security parameter λ.
2.4. Strong Deniability
Informally, an adversary aims to present a “proof" to a third party (judge), claim that any authorized
users were participated in some sessions. We formally define the strong deniability model for DABKE
protocols as follows.
Definition 2.3. Let Σ be an attribute-based key exchange protocol defined by a key generation algorithm
KeyGen and interactive machines ΣI ,ΣR specifying the role of the initiator and responder respectively.
We say that (KeyGen,ΣI ,ΣR) is a concurrently deniable attribute-based key exchange protocol w.r.t the
class Aux of auxiliary inputs, if for any PPTA which runs on input decryption keys dk = (dk1, · · · , dkn),
public keys pk = (pk1, · · · , pkn) and any auxiliary input aux ∈ Aux, there exists a simulator S that, run-
ning on the same inputs (including random coins) as A, produces a simulated view which is statistically
indistinguishable from the real view ofA, where Aux models extra information thatAmay have obtained
in other form such as some legal transcripts eavesdropped by A from the correctly executed protocols.
That is, considering the following two probability distributions where pk = (pk1, · · · , pkn) is the set of
public keys of honest users whose secrets keys are not compromised:
Real(λ, aux) = [(dki, ski, pki)← KeyGen(λ); (aux, dk, pk,View(aux, dk, pk))]
Sim(λ, aux) = [(dki, ski, pki)← KeyGen(λ); (aux, dk, pk, S (aux, dk, pk))]
then for all PPT distinguishers Dist and all aux ∈ Aux, we have
|Prx∈Real(λ,aux)[Dist(x)] = 1− Prx∈Sim(λ,aux)[Dist(x)] = 1| 6 (λ). (2)
where  is a negligible function of the security parameter λ. In particular, the actions of off-line distin-
guisher Dist are described as follows:
• The Dist is given the full protocol transcripts and accepted session keys in which A participated.
• The Dist is allowed to obtain the secret keys of all participants.
Remark. As for the strong sense of deniability, A acts as one of protocol participants. The
View(aux, dk, pk) means that A (maliciously) performs the Σ protocol runs with other honest users
in a real view. While S(aux, dk, pk) means that a simulator S, who is running on the same inputs as
A (including A’s secret key and randomness), simulates an indistinguishable view from a real view to
judge.
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Table 2
Simulated view with respect to †-deniability
Algorithm/Role Simulator Adversary
SIGMA [5]: Partial Initiator (resp., Responder) Responder (resp., Initiator)
TOPAS [35]: Strong Initiator (resp., Responder) Initiator (resp., Responder)
DIKE [10]: “Full" Neither of Them Neither of Them
Ours: Strong Initiator (resp., Responder) Initiator (resp., Responder)
2.5. Relationship with Various Deniability Models
We evaluate the relationship between the commonly used deniability models and our proposed strong
deniability model, and we remove attribute-based context for fair comparison.
Relation to Partial Deniability. The digital signature based key exchange protocol (e.g., SIGMA in
[5]) is partially deniable if the runs of the honest initiator with a responder are indistinguishable from
runs with another responder. In other words, initiator’s transcripts are “peer-independent". The formal
partial deniability model is referred to [5], and we do not consider partial deniability and peer-and-time
deniability [36] in this work.
Relation to “Full" Deniability. Some works [29, 33, 36] have used the term “full" deniability to de-
scribe strong deniability in [5]. The subtle difference between “full" and strong deniability is the actual
role of simulator/adversary. More precisely, in the simulation view of a two-party key exchange setting,
the simulator is outside the protocol participants for “full" deniability, while the simulator is one of
protocol participants for strong deniability. We consider strong deniability [5] in this work.
Relation to On/Off-line Deniability. On-line deniability means that a protocol participant colludes
with the judge during protocol execution. The on-line deniability is a stronger assumption than off-line
deniability [6, 37]. Specifically, the judge is allowed to interact with the adversary before or during the
protocol execution. Since some impossibility results (e.g., in the symmetric-key setting) observed by
Dodis et al. [37] for authentication or key exchange protocols, we consider off-line judge only in this
work.
A Complete Comparison. We present a complete comparison between few well-known deniability
models for authentication/key exchange protocols and our proposed deniability model (see Table. 2),
according to the role of adversary/simulator. We assume an initiator and a responder are running an
AKE protocol, and the †-deniability is corresponding to the last function in Table 1.
In addition, we formalize an off-line judge [6] in our proposed deniability model, such that the judge
is allowed to obtain the secret keys of protocol participants after the protocol execution. Note that our
proposed deniability model has forward deniability as specified in [38].
3. Our Construction
In this section, we firstly review the building blocks that will be used in the proposed generic attribute-
based key exchange compiler, we then present our proposed generic compiler and its security analysis.
10 Tian et al. / DABKE: Secure Deniable Attribute-Based Key Exchange Framework
1 1
2 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 7
8 8
9 9
10 10
11 11
12 12
13 13
14 14
15 15
16 16
17 17
18 18
19 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
26 26
27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44
45 45
46 46
3.1. Building Blocks
Access Structure. Let {P1, · · · , Pn} be a set of parties. A collection Λ ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn} is monotone if
∀B,C : if B ∈ Λ and B ⊆ C then C ∈ Λ. An access structure (i.e., monotone access structure) is a
collection of non-empty subsets of {P1, · · · , Pn} (i.e., Λ ⊆ 2{P1,··· ,Pn}\{φ}). The sets in Λ are called the
authorized sets, and the sets not in Λ are called the unauthorized sets.
Access Tree Λ. Let Λ be a tree representing an access structure. Each non-leaf node of the tree represents
a threshold gate, described by its children and a threshold value. If numi is the number of children of a
node x and kx is its threshold value, then 1 6 kx 6 numx. If kx = 1, it is an OR gate; If kx = numx, it is
an AND gate. Each leaf node x of the tree is described by an attribute and a threshold value kx = 1. We
define the parent of the node x in the tree by parent(x), the attribute associate with the leaf node x in
the tree by att(x), the ordering between the children of every node x in the tree by index(x) (numbered
from 1 to num).
Satisfying an Access Tree. Let Λ be an access tree with root R. The Λx denote the subtree of Λ rooted at
the node x (e.g., Λ = ΛR). If a set of attributes δ satisfies the access tree Λx, we denote it as Λx(δ) = 1.
We compute Λx(δ) as follows: If x is a leaf node, then Λx(δ) returns 1 iff att(x) ∈ δ; If x is a non-leaf
node, evaluate Λx′(δ) for all children x′ of node x. Λx(δ) returns 1 iff at least kx children return 1.
Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption Scheme: It consists of four algorithms [16]: CP-
ABE=(Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec).
• Setup: The algorithm takes the security parameter λ as input, outputs master public parameters mpk
and master secret key msk.
• KeyGen: The algorithm takes the master secret key msk and an attributes set δ as input, outputs a
decryption key dk.
• Enc: The probablistic algorithm takes the master public parameters mpk, a message m and an access
structure Λ as input, outputs a ciphertext CT . The CT implicitly contains Λ.
• Dec: The deterministic algorithm takes the master public parameters mpk, a ciphertext CT and the
decryption key dk as input, outputs the message m if and only if the attributes set δ satisfies the
access structure Λ.
Two-Pass Authenticated Key Exchange (TP-AKE) Protocol: It consists of two algorithms: TP-
AKE=(KeyGen, KeyExchange).
• KeyGen: Each user i outputs a long-term secret/public key pair (ski, pki).
• KeyExchange (KE): This is an interactive algorithm among willing users. It actually consists of the
following sub-algorithms.
∗ KE.Ephemeral: User i outputs an ephemeral secret/public key pair (eki, epki); Note that
ephemeral secret/public key pair may have NAXOS technique for achieving eCK security, and
the detailed technical explanations are referred to [27].
∗ KE.EX: Users exchange their ephemeral public keys, i.e., epki, epk j; Note that users also ex-
change their long-term public keys at post-specified peer setting.
∗ KE.KDF: User i executes a key derivation function and obtains K = KDF : (ski, eki, pk j, epk j)
( j 6= i). Note that we consider TP-AKE protocol in a two-party setting for simplicity. More
generally, we can define K = KDF : (ski, eki, {pk j, epk j}) ( j 6= i) in a multi-party setting.
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Implicit Authentication. Implicit authentication is mainly used to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
for TP-AKE protocols. Specifically, we analyze the common features of TP-AKE protocols as follows:
1) The participants exchange ephemeral public keys only; 2) The key derivation function is composed of
his/her own ephemeral/secret keys (ek, sk), and the peer’s ephemeral/long-term public keys (epk, pk);
3) The exchanged ephemeral public keys are uniformly distributed in the key space.
Relation to Strong Deniability. Two-pass authenticated key exchange protocols with implicit authenti-
cation ensure strong deniability [5], such that one of protocol participants is able to deny his/her session
participations. Specifically, one of session participants can randomly chooses the session transcripts
(i.e., the uniformly distributed ephemeral public keys), and honestly generate the shared key K un-
der the symmetric-key setting. Furthermore, we discover that many existing TP-AKE protocols (e.g.,
[11, 27, 34, 35, 39–43] and enormous HMQV variants) can achieve strong deniability (Definition 2 in
[5]), we then have the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.1. TP-AKE protocols with implicit authentication have the strong deniability defined in [5].
Proof. We assume a two-pass key exchange protocol is executed between Alice and Bob where Alice
sends ephemeral public key epkA to Bob, and vice versa for Bob. We assume that both Alice and Bob
aim to establish a shared key K in a real view. Note that two simulated values will be presented to judge:
the exchanged ephemeral public keys and the resulting shared key. Also note that adversary is one of
protocol participants.
The exchanged ephemeral public key pair (epkA, epkB) derives from either the secret key pair
(ekA, ekB) or the function f (ekA, skA), f (ekB, skB) ( f denotes a randomized algorithm, such as hash func-
tion or pseudorandom function). Simulator S (i.e., adversary Bob) is simply choosing a random value
epkA from ephemeral public space to simulate transmitted ephemeral public key on behalf of Alice,
while the judge cannot statistically distinguish it since the real/simulated value is uniformly distributed
in either the ephemeral public key space or the output of function f (except collisions with a negligible
probability). Note that the judge is not allowed to obtain either ephemeral or long-term secret keys of
protocol participants (refer to Definition 2 in [5]).
The resulting shared key K can be easily simulated by S. Specifically, S (i.e., adversary Bob) randomly
chooses ephemeral public key epkB and computes K = TP− AKE.KE.KDF : (pkA, epkA, skB, ekB),
where secret keys (skB, ekB) are known to S. 
Pseudo-Random Function (PRF). A function family F˜ is associated with {Seedλ}λ∈N, {Domλ}λ∈N,
{Rngλ}λ∈N, where N is the set of natural numbers. Formally, for any randomly chosen K R←− Seedλ,
σ
U←− K, D R←− Domλ, R R←− Rngλ, Fλ,K,D,Rσ define a function which map an element of D to an element
ofR. That is, Fλ,K,D,Rσ (ρ) ∈ R for any ρ ∈ D.
Definition 3.1 (PRF [41]). We say that F˜ is a pseudo-random function (PRF) family if
{F˜λ,K,D,Rσ (ρi)} ≈ {RF(ρi)} (3)
for any ρi ∈ D adaptively chosen by any polynomial time distinguisher, where RF is a truly random
function. That is, for any ρ ∈ D, RF(ρ) U←− R.
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3.2. Generic Compiler
High-level Description. Two authorized users aim to establish a secure session key using their attributes
and public keys, meanwhile a subsequent deniable communication is provided among authorized users.
A generic compiler (GC) is used for adding strong deniability and impersonation-resistance to attribute-
based key exchanges, and the proposed generic compiler consists of the following building blocks.
• An eCK secure TP-AKE protocol TP− AKE = (KeyGen,KeyExchange).
• An ABE scheme ABE = (Setup, KeyGen,Enc,Dec).
• A PRF F˜.
For simplicity, we use initiator Ui and responder U j to illustrate our generic compiler (see Figure 1
below).
Ui (Initiator) U j (Responder)
dki ← ABE.KeyGen dk j ← ABE.KeyGen
(ski, pki)← TP− AKE.KeyGen (sk j, pk j)← TP− AKE.KeyGen
Session Execution
(eki, epki)← TP− AKE.KE.Ephemeral (ek j, epk j)← TP− AKE.KE.Ephemeral
CTi ← ABE.Enc(pki||epki) CT j ← ABE.Enc(pk j||epk j)
CTi−−−−−−−−−→
(pki||epki)← ABE.Dec(CTi)
CT j←−−−−−−−−−−
(pk j||epk j)← ABE.Dec(CT j)
Key Derivation
Ti = TP− AKE.KE.KDF(eki, ski, epk j, pk j) T j = TP− AKE.KE.KDF(ek j, sk j, epki, pki)
S Ki = F˜Ti (sid) S K j = F˜T j (sid)
Fig. 1. Generic Compiler. sid = (epki||epk j)
• Setup: CA takes the security parameter λ as input, outputs master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk).
Let F˜ : K ×D → {0, 1}l(λ) (l is polynomial in the security parameter λ, and l(λ) ∈ R) be a PRF.
• KeyGen: CA runs the ABE.KeyGen algorithm to obtain decryption key dki of user i. In addition, user
i runs the TP-AKE.KeyGen algorithm to obtain his own long-term secret/public key pair (ski, pki).
• KeyExchange: User i (i.e., initiator) performs the following steps.
(1) Run the TP-AKE.KE.Ephemeral algorithm to obtain ephemeral secret/public key pair (eki, epki);
(2) Generate a ciphertext CTi = ABE.Enc(pki||epki) and send it to user j. Note that at CP-ABE
case, ABE.Enc takes master public key mpk, a message mi = (pki||epki) (where epki is also used
for key exchange KE of TP-AKE) and an access structure Λi as input, outputs a ciphertext CTi
which implicitly contains Λi.
Then user j (i.e., responder) performs the following steps.
(1) Obtain (pki||epki) after running ABE.Dec algorithm on CTi; Note that (CP-) ABE.Dec takes
master public key mpk, a ciphertext CTi and the decryption key dk j as input, outputs the message
mi iff the attributes set δ j satisfies the access structure Λi.
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(2) Run the TP-AKE.KE.Ephemeral algorithm to obtain ephemeral secret/public key pair (ek j, epk j);
(3) Generate a ciphertext CT j = ABE.Enc(pk j||epk j) and send CT j to user i;
(4) Compute the final session key S K j = F˜T j(sid), where T j = TP− AKE.KE.
KDF(ek j, sk j, epki, pki), sid = (epki||epk j).
User i performs the following steps.
(1) Obtain (pk j||epk j) after running ABE.Dec algorithm on CT j;
(2) Compute the final session key S Ki = F˜Ti(sid), where Ti = TP− AKE.KE.
KDF(eki, ski, epk j, pk j), sid = (epki||epk j). Note that the equation Ti = T j holds due to the
correctness of TP-AKE protocol.
Remark. One may argue that the proposed GC is transforming from a TP-AKE protocol to an attribute-
based one. Essentially, we aim to prevent impersonation attacks and provide strong deniability for AB-
AKE protocols. To achieve these goals, the proposed GC can be construted from either AB-AKE pro-
tocol with implicit authentication or TP-AKE protocol with ABE scheme, which in turn provides more
flexibility in the sense of generic construction.
3.3. Security Analysis
Theorem 3.2. The proposed GC achieves session key security (Definition 2.2) if the TP-AKE is session
key secure and F˜ is a pseudo-random family.
Proof. We define a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, · · · , 4 and let AdvGCi denote the advantage of the
adversary in game Gi. Assume that A activates at most m sessions in each game.
• G0 This is original game for session key security.
• G1 This game is identical to game G0 except that S will output a random bit if user i (initiator) and
user j (responder) accept, but pidi 6= pid j, sidi 6= sid j. Since n users involved in this game, we have:
∣∣AdvGC0 − AdvGC1 ∣∣ 6 n · m2/2λ (4)
• G2: This game is identical to game G1 except the following difference: S randomly chooses g
∈ [1,m] as a guess for the index of the test session. S will output a random bit ifA’s test query does
not occur in the g-th session. Therefore we have
AdvGC1 = m · AdvGC2 (5)
• G3 This game is identical to game G2 except that in the g-th session, S replaces the real TP-AKE
session key by a random value R ∈ K. Below we show the difference between G2 and G3 is
negligible under the assumption that TP-AKE is eCK secure. Note that we choose eCK security of
TP-AKE in this game, which is used to match our proposed session key security defined in Section
2.2.
Let S denotes an attacker against the TP-AKE protocol, who is given corresponding oracles in the
sense of eCK security model, and aims to distinguish a real session key from a random value. S
simulates the game for A as follows.
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∗ Setup: S sets up the game forA by creating n users with the corresponding attributes/identity set
{δi, IDi}. S honestly generates master public/secret key pair (mpk,msk) for CA. In addition, S
generates user’s decryption keys {dki} by running ABE.KeyGen algorithm and public/secret key
pairs {(pki, ski)} from his oracle queries (i.e., long-term secret key query). Eventually, S sends
all attribute sets, identities and public keys to A.
∗ S answers A’s queries as follows.
∗ If A issues send query in the form of CT j = Enc(pk j||epk j) to user i, then S will perform the
simulation as follows.
· Obtain messages pk j, epk j using decryption key of user i;
· Forward epk j to his challenger and obtain epki from his send oracle;
· Return CTi = Enc(pki||epki) as the response to A;
· Compute the final session key S Ki = F˜Ti(sid), where Ti is obtained from either session key
reveal oracle or test oracle w.r.t. g-th session, and sid = (pki||pk j||epki||epk j).
Note that if A issues send query in the form of (U ′,′ start′,ΛU′), then S returns CT ′ =
Enc(pkU′ ||epk′) (epk′ is randomly chosen by S) to A.
∗ If A issues an ephemeral key reveal query to S, then S makes an ephemeral key reveal query
to its own oracle to get eki and returns it to A.
∗ If A issues a long-term key reveal query to user i, then S returns (dki, ski) to A.
∗ If A issues a master secret key reveal query to S, then S returns msk to A.
∗ S answers the session key reveal query and test query by using the session key S Ki it has
derived during the protocol simulation described above.
Note that in the test session S will get either a real session key or a random key from his own
test oracle. If it is the real session key, then the simulation is consistent with G2; Otherwise, the
simulation is consistent with G3. Therefore, if the advantage of A is significantly different in G2
and G3, S can break the TP-AKE protocol. Hence, we have∣∣AdvGC2 − AdvGC3 ∣∣ 6 AdvTP−AKES (λ) (6)
• G4: This game is identical to game G3 except that in the test session, we replace the PRF function
F˜Ti(sid) by a random function. We next to showing the difference between G3 and G4 is negligible
if F˜ is PRF family.
Let S denotes an attacker against the PRF, who is given an oracle either F˜σ (σ U←− K) or a random
function RF, aims to distinguish them. S simulates the game for A as the exact same way as G3
except the computation of final session key S Ki = F˜T∗i (sid
∗). Specifically, S forwards sid∗ to his
challenger and sets the value returned from the oracle as S Ki. Finally, S outputs whateverA outputs.
Note that in the test session, if the oracle is F˜σ (note that the returned value F˜σ(sid∗) from the oracle
is indistinguishable from F˜T∗i (sid
∗) because the value T ∗i
U←− K in G3 is uniform and independent),
then the simulation is consistent with G3; Otherwise, the simulation is consistent with G4. There-
fore, if the advantage of A is significantly different in G3 and G4, S can break the PRF family.
Hence, we have∣∣AdvGC3 − AdvGC4 ∣∣ 6 AdvPRFS (λ) (7)
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It is easy to see that in game G4, A has no advantage, i.e.,
AdvGC4 = 0 (8)
Combining the above results together, we have
AdvGCA (λ) = n · m2/2λ + m · (AdvTP−AKES (λ) + AdvPRFS (λ)).

Remark. The impersonation attacks can be prevented in an implicit manner. If adversary can perform the
impersonation attacks with a non-negligible probability, then we can use it to built an efficient attacker
to break the session key security of TP-AKE protocol.
Theorem 3.3. The proposed GC achieves user privacy (Definition 2.3) if the ABE scheme is selective
IND-CPA secure.
Proof. Let S denote an attacker who is given the KeyGen oracle and challenge access structure Λ∗ (CP-
ABE case), aims to break the selective IND-CPA (sIND-CPA) security of ABE scheme. S simulates the
game for A as follows.
• Setup: S sets up the game for A by creating n users with the corresponding attributes/identity set
{δi, IDi}. Then S honestly generates user’s public/secret key pairs {(pki, ski)}. Eventually, S sends
all attribute sets, identities and public keys to A.
• Training: S answers A’s queries as follows.
∗ If A issues an execute query between user i and user j (Λ∗(δi) = 1 and Λ∗(δ j) = 1), then
S randomly chooses ephemeral secret keys (eki, ek j), and performs the session execution and
session key derivation honestly according to the protocol specification.
∗ S answers ephemeral secret key reveal and session key reveal queries using the secret values it
has derived during the protocol simulation described above. In addition, S can honestly answer
long-term secret key reveal queries to users Λ∗(δw) 6= 1 (w 6= i, j) using his KeyGen oracle.
• Challenge: After receiving user i and user j (Λ∗(δi) = 1 and Λ∗(δ j) = 1) from A, S firstly follows
the user privacy game to select U∗b and construct message m0 = (pkb||epkb). Secondly, S randomly
chooses another user l (Λ∗(δl) = 1), and generates another message m1 = (pkl||epkl). Thirdly, S
sends challenge messages (m0,m1) to his challenger oracle, and obtains challenge ciphertext C∗ as
the transcript of U∗b . Note that epkb, epkl are randomly chosen by S, and a randomly chosen value
R acts as the transcript of user l.
Finally, S outputs whatever A outputs. If A guesses the random bit correctly, then S can break the
selective IND-CPA security of ABE. Hence, we have
AdvGCA (λ) 6 AdvsIND−CPAS (λ).

Theorem 3.4. The proposed GC achieves strong deniability defined in Definition 2.4.
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Proof. We assume the GC is executed between Alice and Bob where Alice sends CTA to Bob, and
vice versa for Bob. We assume that both Alice and Bob aim to establish a shared session key S K in a
real view. Note that two simulated values will be presented to a judge: the exchanged ciphertexts and
the resulting session key. Also note that adversary is one of protocol participants who can decrypt the
ciphertext from its counterpart.
Simulator S (i.e., adversary Bob) simulates Alice’s transcript as follows: S randomly chooses
ephemeral public key epkA as described in Lemma 3.1, and generates ciphertext as CTA ←
ABE.Enc(pkA||epkA). As for Bob’s transcript and resulting session key, S can generate cipher-
text CTB and session key S KB by following the GC execution honestly. Specifically, the ci-
phertext is CTB ← Enc(pkB||epkB) and the resulting session key is S KB = F˜TB(sid), where
TB = TP− AKE.KE.KDF(ekB, skB, epkA, pkA), sid = (pkA||pkB||epkA||epkB), and (ekB, epkB) ←
TP− AKE.KE.Ephemeral. Note that the secret keys (skB, ekB) are known to S.
We stress that an off-line judge is allowed to obtain long-term secret keys (skA, skB) rather than
ephemeral secret keys, the transcripts simulated by S are statistically indistinguishable from a real view
because the randomly chosen value (e.g., epkA) in simulated transcript is uniformly distributed as in a
real view. Since S can simulate the transcripts and resulting session key in the exact same way as a real
protocol execution between Alice and Bob, the simulation by S is perfect to a judge.

4. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a deniable attribute-based secure key exchange framework based on the
attribute-based encryption schemes and implicitly authenticated key exchange protocols. We defined the
formal security models to capture the security requirements, including session key security, user privacy
and strong deniability. We leave the construction of attribute-based secure key exchange with on-line
deniability in the standard model as our future work.
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